Instruction override
Checks whether a direct “ignore previous instructions” command can replace the system rules.
Free Tools / AI Security
Put your system prompt through five common injection attacks and see where its boundaries fail before attackers do.
Runs on Framz-owned AI hardware — prompts are never stored
Processed in memory on Framz-owned AI hardware. Your prompt and model responses are not stored.
We test instruction override, role-play escape, prompt extraction, delimiter escape, and indirect injection before showing a result.
A useful baseline spans direct jailbreaks and instructions smuggled through data your application trusted.
Checks whether a direct “ignore previous instructions” command can replace the system rules.
Uses a fictional debugging role to test whether policy boundaries survive changes in persona.
Requests translation or transformation of hidden instructions instead of asking for them directly.
Injects fake message boundaries and system tags to challenge role separation.
Places hostile instructions inside content presented as a document or retrieval result.
Use the system instructions that define your assistant’s role, boundaries, and tool rules.
Five attacks execute concurrently against the same target model and system prompt.
Review evidence and apply a specific defensive improvement for every failed or unclear test.
The defensive patterns we apply to production LLM systems, in checklist form.
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Prompt injection is an attempt to make an AI system ignore its controlling instructions, reveal hidden context, or follow hostile instructions embedded in user or retrieved content.
It runs five baseline patterns: direct instruction override, role-play escape, system prompt extraction by transformation, fake delimiter escape, and indirect injection hidden inside retrieved content.
No. It is processed in memory on AI hardware operated by Framz and is not written to the tools database. We store only anonymous operational usage and your verified tool-access activity.
No. It means the prompt resisted these five baseline attacks in this run. Production testing should also cover your tools, retrieval sources, conversation memory, output handling, and application-specific abuse cases.
Define instruction priority, treat retrieved content as untrusted data, prohibit disclosure and transformation of hidden instructions, constrain tool use, validate outputs, and enforce sensitive controls outside the model.
Framz designs tool permissions, retrieval boundaries, policy enforcement, evaluations, and monitoring around production AI systems.